Towarda Liberalism is a philosophy book and I can only guess it was free at some point,
as otherwise I don’t know why I would have bought it?
The blurb says:
In Toward a Liberalism, Richard Flathman shows why and how political theory can contribute to the quality of moral and political practice without violating, as empiricist- and idealist-based theories tend to do, liberal commitments to individuality and plurality. Exploring the tense but inevitable relationship between liberalism and authority, he advances a theory of democratic citizenship tempered by appreciation of the ways in which citizenship is implicated with and augments authority. Flathman examines the relationship of individual rights to freedom on one hand and to authority and power on the other, rejecting the quest for a single homogenous and authoritative liberal theory.
It’s
a collection of essays and I confess that much of it was beyond my
understanding, having never studied philosophy before. After
finishing the first essay, I decided to persevere and read the other
essays too, but many of the technical (philosophical) definitions
were unknown to me, so though I understood the individual words, some
of the sentences seemed to talk around in circles.
After
each essay, I wrote up a brief description, and that has become a bit
of an essay in itself.
The first essay is all about Theory and Practice. It centres around Oakeshott’s and Wittgenstein’s view on how philosophical theory and philosophical practice are related – or not. Not knowing beforehand what their views are (tbh, I hadn’t heard of them before) I was at a disadvantage, so could only go by the author’s description of their views and therefore his (the author) critique of their validity. I think the final two sentences in this essay to be a good summary:
The first essay is all about Theory and Practice. It centres around Oakeshott’s and Wittgenstein’s view on how philosophical theory and philosophical practice are related – or not. Not knowing beforehand what their views are (tbh, I hadn’t heard of them before) I was at a disadvantage, so could only go by the author’s description of their views and therefore his (the author) critique of their validity. I think the final two sentences in this essay to be a good summary:
But if liberalism acknowledges and welcomes the variety and changeable character of moral and political practices, if it recognizes and delights in the restless diversity of moral and political practitioners, these conclusions concerning the limitations and possibilities of theory and theorizing are neither surprising nor disturbing, neither to be resisted nor regretted. More than this the theorist of theory and practice cannot and should not try to say.
The
second essay is all about the difference between in authority,
an authority and authoritative. I found this essay
much more understandable. It was shorter than the first essay, and
kept on point. It still requires concentration, but I found myself
nodding along as I was reading. My quoted summary of this essay:
Liberals
are correct that authority is dangerous. … Nevertheless, by
comparison with our other practices, authority abbreviates and
truncates the processes of reflection and judgment through which
agreement develops among free human beings.
The
third essay is about authority and citizenship, and whether you can
have one without the other. Authority is always objectionable as it
only has a role when we’re unsure about the actions we should take.
Some philosophers talk about high and low citizenship, but that
doesn’t change the character of authority, rather the attitudes of
citizens to that authority.
The
fourth essay is about freedom, what freedom means and whether it is
good or not. Within this chapter, there’s a section on religious
freedom and freedom of religion, which I found much more
understandable than other sections – probably because, being a
Christian, it is relevant and therefore more interesting to me. It
also discusses the link between freedom and perfectionism; and
whether freedom is a liberal conception that has a role in political
philosophy or not.
The
fifth essay is about moderating rights, perhaps because of extremism
attached to the rights itself resulting in ultra vires behaviours of
those looking to reinforce those rights. Again, I have found this
chapter very relatable to me, due to having encountered many Local
Authorities who do act ultra vires surrounding Home Education –
claiming that home educators must accept visits, and that we
must send them samples of our children’s work etc (when in
fact, most Elective Home Education Officers who work for the Local
Authority have zero qualifications in education, let alone have
knowledge of home education or child pedagogy). The essay then goes
on to defend civil encroachment and civil non-enforcement. The essay
ends:
If
I am correct in thinking that extremism in the exercise of at least
some rights is prevalent, and increased incidence of announced and
defended civil encroachment might benefit the practice of rights in
much the manner that civil disobedience has benefited the practice of
authority.
The
sixth essay looks specifically at the Theory of Rights and the
Practice of Abortion. As somebody who used to be very anti-abortion,
but now thinks it is correct that abortion is safe and legal – I
just wish it was a service that never had to be used (see my previous
blog on the topic) – I was interested to see what conclusions the
essay would draw. It is quite a long chapter, so though it was
interesting, it took a long time to read through. Sometimes I felt
Flathman jumped in his reasoning, or made assumptions that I couldn’t
quite logically follow (that is not to say they were illogical, just
that I an a non-philosophy student could not follow them).
He
goes through various arguments against abortion if the foetus is
animate, sentient and possessed of reflexive consciousness. Within
this latter discussion, Flathman says:
...it
follows from these facts about it that the fetus should not be
thought of a bearer or possessor of rights. To have a right is to be
in a position to choose to exercise that right or not…
He
then goes on to say that since a foetus cannot exercise that right,
the fetus does not have any rights, and therefore the argument
against a right to abortion due to the rights of the fetus is null
and void. This is one of the arguments that I didn’t understand,
since surely children are not in a position to exercise a particular
right or not, but that doesn’t mean we have a right to infanticide;
or women in some areas of the world may not know or not be in a
position to exercise any rights, but that doesn’t mean that they
should be walked over and treated as property. But as I said, it may
be that I simply don’t understand the words that he is using, but
this seems like a poor argument to me.
Flathman
also uses the argument that “Abortions do not destroy human
persons. Abortions destroy fetuses.” but does not elaborate as to
when exactly the fetus does become a human, implying it is at the
moment of birth. In fact he equates a fetus with being simply a
sperm or ovum, and if a foetus should not be wasted, then it should
similarly be prohibited to use contraceptives, masturbation or any
kind of act where they may be destroyed. Yet a sperm on its own, or
an egg on its own, will never become a foetus.
In
the section entitled “Can a Legal or Moral Right in the Strict
Sense to Abortion on Demand Be Justified?” Flathman expands on how
such a right for one person impacts on other people – specifically
if the second person has a moral/religious/other reasoning why they
won’t perform the abortion.
The
answer to these questions is a qualified yes.
…
The
yes is qualified for the same kinds of reasons that have convinced a
number of societies to qualify the obligations imposed on pacifists
and other conscientious objectors to do military service in what are
believed to be justified wars. … And so far we can [establish both
a legal and moral right] without nullifying the right, we should
excuse from the correlative obligations those persons for whom
abortion remains morally unacceptable.
I
will end my analysis of this essay by quoting a few sentences from
his conclusion:
The
concept of a right is one of the most widely used, and most commonly
abused, items in our moral and political lexicon. We have claims to
an extraordinary variety of rights and we find rights attributed to
an astonishing diversity of creatures and things.
… because that case is very strong, and because its strength derives in no small part from the support it receives from the principle (LP) which provides the optimum bases for defending individual rights, a right to abortion on demand is exactly what women ought to have.
… because that case is very strong, and because its strength derives in no small part from the support it receives from the principle (LP) which provides the optimum bases for defending individual rights, a right to abortion on demand is exactly what women ought to have.
The
final essay is entitled “Egalitarian Blood and Skeptical Turnips”.
I don’t know if all my brain cells were used up on the previous
essay, but I didn’t really get this. It discusses reasonings by
Ackerman, and whether they are reasonable or not, but seemed to go
round in circles to me. I can tell you that the essay was discussing
Morality, Neutrality1 and Neutrality2, but in
all honesty, I didn’t get my head around what they meant, nor which
Neutrality was which. I did highlight some parts of the chapter,
that I will quote below, but I can’t really remember why or the
relevance of them.
Accordingly,
he takes the familiar tack of contending that in reason everyone
should or ought to agree to those policies and that those who do
agree are justified in imposing the policies on those who fail to see
the light.
And
also,
Justifying
policies by arguing that they contribute to this (or any other)
agreed-upon end is a far cry from claiming that they are required
because we cannot agree upon ends.
And
finally,
If
all that Ackerman gave us in support of egalitarian policies of
Neutrality1 was the skeptical foundations of Neutrality2,
he would have given us precisely nothing in support of those
policies.
Overall,
I am glad I stretched myself and read this collection of essays, even
though I freely admit I didn’t understand it all, and that some
spoke to me clearer than others. I have a friend who is currently
studying Politics, Philosophy and Economics and I do now understand
some of what she talks about, even if I can’t necessarily reply
using correct philosophical terms.
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